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Recent Cases
TORTS-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS Acr-NEGLIGENT APPRAISAL BY AG=N
OF FEDERAL HOUSING COM ssiONE-Plaintiff, during negotiations for
the purchase of a house, applied for a conditional mortgage insurance
commitment, as provided by the National Housing Act.' The house
was appraised by an employe of the Federal Housing Administration
(hereinafter referred to as FHA), and plaintiff was informed of its
estimated value. Plaintiff was furnished a written statement of the
appraised value,2 an FHA insured loan was obtained, and he pur-
chased the house. After plaintiff took possession of the house serious
structural defects appeared which a qualified appraiser, by exercising
reasonable care, could have ascertained. In an action against the
Government, the District Court and the Court of Appeals4 allowed
plaintiff, under the Federal Tort Claims Act,5 to recover the difference
between purchase price and actual value. Held: Reversed. Recovery
is barred by the provision of the FTCA which excludes claims arising
out of misrepresentation.0 United States v. Neustadt, 81 Sup. Ct. 1294
(1961).
The FTCA waives the Government's immunity from liability for
the tortious conduct of its employes, with certain exceptions, including
"any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepre-
sentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights."7 When the
Government by representing that it has performed an act, leads a
reasonable person to believe it was performed with care, and he is
damaged because in fact it was negligently performed, or not per-
formed at all, this question arises: can plaintiff recover for misfeasance
or nonfeasance or is recovery barred because misrepresentation is
involved?
The misrepresentation exclusion of the FTCA has been held to
include claims arising from negligent misrepresentations.8 In Jones v.
1 Section 1 (a) 72 Stat. 73, 12 U.S.C. § 1709(a)(1958).
2 The Nationaf Houising Act § 115, 71 Stat. 298, 12 U.S.C. § 1715
(q) (1957) requires the seller of a dwelling approved for mortgage insurance
to furish the purchaser, prior to sale, a written statement of the appraised value
as determined by the Federal Housing Commissioner.
a United States v. Neustadt, 281 F.2d 596, 598 (4th Cir. 1960).4 United States v. Neustadt, 281 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1960).
5 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (Codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) [herein-
after referred to as FTCA].028 U.S.C. § 2.680(h) (1958).
7 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
8 See cases cited in United States v. Neustadt, 81 Sup. Ct. 1294, 1298 (1961).
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United States9 an agent of the Geological Survey negligently under-
estimated the value of oil reserves under land owned by a corporation
of which plaintiff was a shareholder. Plaintiff sold his shares at a lower
price than he could have if a correct estimate had been made. The
court in denying recovery reasoned that Congress must have intended
to exclude claims arising from negligent misrepresentation because:
(1) the FTCA specifically excludes claims founded upon deceit which
comprehends an intentional misstatement, (2) the FTCA separately
excludes claims founded upon misrepresentation, (3) therefore, Con-
gress must have intended the misrepresentation exclusion to compre-
hend negligent misstatements. Any other interpretation placed upon
these exclusions would render them redundant.10 This reasoning con-
trasts sharply with the language of Congressional reports on the FTCA:
The other exemptions in section 4-2 [of the FTCA] relate to
certain governmental activities which should be free from the threat
of damage suits, or for which adequate remedies are already available.
These exemptions cover claims arising out of... deliberate torts such
as assault and battery.... (Emphasis added.)31
The excluded torts have been described as "deliberate torts, well estab-
lished in the common law,"' 2 or "torts partaking of an intentional
wrong."'3 The court, however, did not inquire into the legislative
history of the FTCA. Instead, it seemed pre-occupied with the ques-
tion of whether section 226 of the National Housing Act authorized
recovery on the facts of the instant case.14 In the absence of a specific
statute negating the Government's liability,15 plaintiffs recovery logi-
cally should turn on the existence of a common law or statutory duty,
a breach thereof, and a waiver of immunity by the Government.
Furthermore, the distinction between deceit and misrepresentation
is by no means so easily drawn as it was by the court in the Jones case,
and as echoed by the court in the instant case. To maintain an action
for deceit some jurisdictions require that the misstatement be in-
tentional. In other jurisdictions an unintentional misstatement will
support an action for deceit:
9 207 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1953).
10 Id. at 564.
"1 H.R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945). Substantially identical
language appears in S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946).
12 ottleb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 Ceo.
L.J. 1, 49 (1946).
' Address by Hon. Rubey M. Hulen, Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals, before St. Louis section of the Missouri Bar Ass'n, Feb. 27, 1948, 7
F.R.D. 689, 694 (1948).
14 United States v. Neustadt, 81 Sup. Ct. 1294, 1301 (1961).
15 E.g., Mid-Central Fish Co. v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Mo.
1953).
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The first and smaller group [of cases rejecting the requirement of an
intentional misstatement] holds that an action of deceit is maintain-
able against a defendant who has honestly misstated a fact upon
which he intends the plaintiff to act ... if he fails to exercise reason-
able care in ascertaining the data upon which his statement is based,
or if he fails to exercise the judgment of a reasonable man upon care-
fully collected data. (Emphasis added.)16
Therefore, it is inevitable that the terms deceit, misrepresentation, and
negligent misrepresentation would be used loosely. In one jurisdiction
deceit might embrace an intentional misstatement, whereas in another
it might connote an innocent misstatement based on negligently
ascertained data.
Recovery under the FTCA is in accordance with the law of the
place in which the tort occurs.-7 Congress has described the excluded
torts as deliberate.18 Regardless of the name used to describe the
action in the jurisdiction involved, Congress apparently intended to
exclude recovery for intentional misstatements. To allow recovery for
a negligent misstatement would not render redundant the deceit and
misrepresentation exclusions of section 2680(h) of the FTCA.
The misrepresentation exclusion of the FTCA was first raised as a
defense in Mid-Central Fish Co. v. United States,"9 an action for
damages caused by negligent flood forecasts. Recovery was denied
on the grounds, inter alia, that Congress intended misrepresentation,
as used in the FTCA, to include negligent misrepresentation. Re-
covery could have been denied without an interpretation of the FTCA,
because the Flood Control Act of 1928 specifically excludes recovery
against the Government for damage "from or by a flood." 20 The Court
in the principal case ignored this alternate ground for decision in the
Mid-Central Fish Co. case.
The reasoning of the court in Jones v. United States2 ' has been dis-
cussed above. Here again, an interpretation of the FTCA was not
necessary to deny recovery, because members of the Geological Survey
are not permitted to execute surveys or examinations for private
parties.22 Recovery should be denied because the Government owed
16 Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 Harv. L.
Rev. 733, 735 (1929). See also authorities cited id. at 735-36 n.3.
1728 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (Supp. I,
1959).
18 H.R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945); S. Rep. No. 1400,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946).
19 112 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Mo. 1953), aff'd sub nom. National Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954).
20 National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 271 (8th Cir. 1954).
21207 F.2d 563, 564 (2d Cir. 1953).
22 43 U.S.C. § 31 (1958). The Court of Appeals in United States v. Neustadt,
281 F.2d 596, 599 n.3 (4th Cir. 1960), took note of this aspect of Jones v. United
States.
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plaintiff no duty of care,23 or because the particular Government
employe was acting outside the scope of his authority. 24 However,
the Supreme Court in the principal case again refused to recognize the
weakness of an alternate ground for decision of a case upon which it
relied for support.
The reasoning of the first cases holding misrepresentation to com-
prehend negligent misrepresentation are apparently unsound. Further-
more, as these cases could have been decided on other grounds, they
are of questionable value as precedent for subsequent cases where
recovery could have been denied only if the misrepresentation exclu-
sion were held to include negligent misrepresentation.
The approach to cases involving misrepresentation should first be
to determine what duty, if any, was owed plaintiff, and then to decide
whether a claim for the breach of that duty is excluded by the FTCA.
United States v. Otness25 and both lower courts hearing the principal
case held that the Government owed plaintiff a duty to perform an act
with care. The negligent performance of the act was the gravamen of
the complaint.26 In each case the Government had assumed a duty to
act and had negligently performed that duty. Neither the fact that
the Government communicated the results of the act, nor the fact that
plaintiff reasonably assumed that the act was performed with care, is
reason for invoking the exclusion of misrepresentation, even if it were
interpreted as including negligent misrepresentation.27  The funda-
mental cause of plaintiffs loss was the breach of a duty to perform an
act with care which was owed plaintiff by the Government. If a
specific duty to act is owed plaintiff, recovery should not be denied
because an element of misrepresentation exists, even if misrepresenta-
tion included negligent misrepresentation.28 It might be reasoned that
two duties are owed plaintiff: (1) the duty to perform an act with
23That a common law duty to exercise reasonable care, arising from the
Government's undertaking to act, may be imposed upon the Government was
recognized in Union Trust Co. v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 80, 84 (D.D.C.
1953) and Social Security Administration Baltimore Fed. Credit Union v. United
States, 138 F. Supp. 639, 648 (D. Md. 1956).2428 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
25 178 F. Supp. 647 (D. Alaska 1959). Defendant negligently searched for
and failed to find a missing channel marker, and then issued a bulletin stating
that no part of the marker remained above the natural contour of the bottom.
Plaintiff's ship subsequently struck the submerged marker and was damaged.
26 United States v. Neustadt, 281 F.2d 596, 602 (4th Cir. 1960).
27 Id. at 601: [T]he government owed a specific duty to the plaintiffs....
It does not necessarily follow ... that the case falls within the exemption of
the Tort Claims Act, since it involves not only misrepresentation but also
negligent performance of a definite duty owed to the plaintiffs.
28 Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 Harv. L.
Rev. 733, 746 (1929): "[In negligent misrepresentation the important thing is
the negligence and not the fact that it is a misrepresentation ....
1961]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
care; and (2) the duty to correctly communicate the results of the act.
If both duties are breached, and if the FTCA bars recovery for loss
occasioned by negligent misrepresentation, recovery should still be
allowed for the breach of the duty to act with care. If only the first
duty is breached, recovery should be allowed for the same reason.
If only the second duty is breached, recovery depends on the inter-
pretation given to the misrepresentation exclusion of the FTCA.
If the foregoing reasoning, though inconsistent with the reasoning
actually used, had been applied in the Mid-Central Fish Co. and Jones
cases, the same result would have been reached: recovery was denied
because the Government owed no duty to perform the act with care,
or the Government employe was acting outside the scope of his em-
ployment. Applying the same reasoning process the court in the
Otness case allowed recovery.29
A possible explanation of the court's disposition of the principal
case, not implicitly stated in the opinion, is that the court was reluctant
to hold that on the facts a duty of care to the prospective mortgagor
was imposed upon the Government. A duty of reasonable care, arising
from a voluntary undertaking, can be imposed upon the Government."0
It is arguable that under the circumstances of 'this case a reasonable
person would not rely solely upon the appraisal of an FHA agent,
hence the court's inquiry into the history of the Federal Housing Act.
This may be the reason the court summarily concluded that recovery
for negligent misrepresentations is excluded from the FTCA, and also
refused to impose liability for a negligent act of the defendant. This
reasoning would be more acceptable in light of the manifest intention
of the framers of the FTCA.81
An additional argument, based on policy, warrants an opposite
disposition of the Neustadt case. The Government is becoming in-
creasingly involved in many areas where private interests are per-
forming similar functions. If Government activity is justified because
2 9 Anglo-American & Overseas Corp. v. United States, 242 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.
1957), is an interesting example of a case where, it is believed, a sound result
was not reached. Plaintiff was to buy certain imported merchandise for resale to
the Government, providing such merchandise was not excluded by the Government
pursuant to the Pure Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The goods were inspected
by the Government and a release notice sent plaintiff. When the goods were
subsequently delivered to the Government they were again tested by the Food
and Drug Administration, found to be adulterated, and destroyed. Plaintiff's
complaint was dismissed in an action based upon a negligent inspection when the
goods first entered the country. Testimony should have been heard to allow
plaintiff to attempt to establish a duty of care upon the Government arising from
owledge that importers customarily use conditional purchase agreements of this
type, and rely upon the Government's inspection of the imported goods.3o See generally note 23, supra.
81H.R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945); S. Rep. No. 1400,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946).
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it can provide services such as mortgage insurance to the consumer at
more economical rates than private interests, then if to provide these
services at lower prices the Government requires exemption from
liability to which the private interests would be subjected, the argu-
ment justifying the Government's activity is fallacious. In light of the
strong argument which can be presented for interpreting the FTCA
as allowing recovery for negligent misrepresentation, it is urged that
Government liability be allowed at least where the Government ac-
tivity causing plaintiff's loss has a private counterpart.
H. Jefferson Herbert, Jr.
WoK.mN's ComxPENsATioN-SET-OFFs AND DEDUCrIONS FOR RE-EMPLOY-
MENT-ABANDONMENT OF Tm "Drrr" RuLE-Claimant was employed
as a truck driver at an average weekly wage of $96.00. He sustained
a compensable injury which disabled him from driving motor vehicles,
but was thereafter employed by the same employer as a "gasser" at a
wage of $119.00 per week. The Workmen's Compensation Board made
an award for total permanent disability and denied the employer's
claim of credit for the weeks after the injury in which he employed
claimant at wages exceeding those paid prior to the injury. The
circuit court affirmed. The employer appealed, alleging several errors'
including the refusal to allow the credit claimed. Held: Affirmed. An
employer is not entitled to credit against a workmen's compensation
award for total permanent disability for weeks in which he employed
claimant at wages exceeding those paid prior to the injury.2 E. & L.
Transp. Co. v. Hayes, 841 S.W.2d 240 (Ky. 1960).
The court's reasoning concerning the issue of credit is complex
and merits some elaboration; this requires an examination of the
history of the Ditty rule in order to show the factors that led to its
development and the justification of its final abandonment in Ken-
tucky.
The rule was first enunciated in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Ditty,3
where the claimant was totally and permanently disabled from per-
forming his former work. The court held that he was entitled to
lError was alleged in the Board's (1) refusing to require further medical
examination, and (2) finding of total permanent disability. E. & L. Transp. Co. v.
Hayes, 341 S.W.2d 240, 241 (Ky. 1960).
2 The court also held that the question of additional examinations under Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 842.205 (1960) [hereinafter cited as KRS] was within the discretion
of the Board, and that where an employee is totally disabled from performing the
work of his former occupation and his capacity to perform other kinds of work is
impaired, he is entitled to compensation for the total disability under KRS 342.095.
3 286 Ky. 395, 150 S.W.2d 672 (1941).
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